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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate the role interlocking directorships play in the patenting
activities of UK companies and provide further insights into the channels through which this re-
lationship emerges. We develop a theoretical model that identifies interlocking directorships as a
mechanism for resolving property rights conflicts. Our empirical analysis suggests a strong rela-
tionship between interlocking and patenting behaviour and finds that interlocking leads to a higher
number of successful patent applications, particularly for those firms located in technology-intensive
industries.
JEL classification: O31; O32; D85; G30; J49
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1 Introduction
The allocation of the majority of resources in a market economy is entrusted to the wisdom of a
small number of individuals who sit as directors on company boards. An important factor in the
concentration of decision rights is the phenomenon of directors interlocking; that is, one director at
one company can sit on the board of another institution and often at multiple institutions. Because
these individuals typically share cultural and educational backgrounds (Mizruchi, 1996), this has led
to popular charges of corporate elitism (Schwartz, 1987), and restrictions on interlocking have been
created to mitigate the risk of collusive behaviour (Monks and Minow, 2011).
Interlocks are an interesting phenomenon for reasons that go beyond concerns over collusion. Why
exactly directors interlock remains unclear. Narratives of interlocking have been advanced with respect
to enforcing collusive agreements (Pennings, 1980), increasing the CEO’s bargaining power over the
monitors of his or her pay and performance (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003), increasing the firm’s reputation
and legitimacy as perceived by providers of financial capital1 (Dooley, 1969; DiMaggio and Powell,
1983), and increasing the human capital of the interlocked director (Conyon and Read, 2006). In this
paper, we investigate a relatively unexplored dimension in this literature, namely, how interlocking
directors can have an impact on the patenting activity of firms.
We create a theoretical model that identifies conditions under which interlocking and patenting
is the Nash equilibrium and the interlock results in an increase in the expected number of patents.
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1Interlocks may also arise when a financial institution appoints the same individual to more than one firm.
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In our theoretical model, when firms choose to patent they face uncertainty regarding whether they
are actually going to enjoy the monopoly profits associated with the patent. This is because there
is a possibility that their technology overlaps with that of a competing firm which could lead to an
intellectual property (IP) rights conflict. The uncertainty regarding whether the firm is going to win
in the case of conflict, with entitlement to use the patent, may deter investment in patenting. In
this context, interlocking directors emerge as a solution that coordinates actions across firms in such
a way that both firms are able to enjoy a part of the patenting rents. Overall, our model predicts
interlocking increases patenting.
We then test the main hypothesis of the theoretical model. To do so, we first construct a database
with all director connections (interlocks) among UK listed companies using data from FAME over
the period 1998-2012, and then merge this database with data on patenting activity obtained from
PATSTAT. We obtain empirical support for our main theoretical result which is that interlocking
increases patenting.
The assumptions in our theoretical model arise out of a rich literature that claims that networks
are an important source of coordination between firms (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Mowery,
1990; Gemser and Wijnberg, 1995; Oerlemans et al., 1998; Crépon et al., 1998; Powell, 1998) together
with a literature that identifies uncertainty as a key consideration in a firm’s decision to patent its
innovations (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Lemley and Shapiro, 2005; Heger and Zaby, 2013).
This uncertainty is reinforced by the fact that involuntary patent infringement seems to be a frequent
phenomenon. In a survey collected from IP managers, Cockburn and Henderson (2003) reveal that
around just one third of their respondents conduct a prior art search before they start a new R&D
project. Further, in the US, Cotripia and Lemley (2009) find that only a small proportion of defendants
involved in cases of patent infringement have actually copied the patented technology, whilst Bessen
and Meurer (2008) show that most of the defendants in cases of patent litigation are inadvertent
infringers.
Additionally, while empirical evidence on IP conflicts and litigation is rare, there is survey evidence
suggesting that IP conflicts and disputes are a common concern in industries where technology is
frequently patented, but that only a fraction of these conflicts ever make it to court. For example,
among Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in the UK, Greenhalgh et al. (2010) find that around
40% of the patent holding firms in their survey had been involved in an IP dispute over a five year
period and yet only 13% of the disputes ended in court. This would suggest intermediation between
firms prior to litigation. While settlements can occur without interlocking, we propose that firms may
use interlocking directors to consolidate this process.
The literature also suggests that firms use interlocking directorships as a way to reduce their op-
erational and environmental uncertainty (Schoorman et al., 1981; Mizruchi, 1996). While, innovation
decisions are usually the responsibility of specialist managers within the firm, board directors are
expected to supervise strategic decisions involving innovation (Helmers et al., 2017). In particular,
industry publications document that innovation is part of the governance responsibility of the board
of directors. As a result, board directors, including outside non-executive directors, are found to
shape the innovation strategy of the firm. As argued by Deschamps (2013), in companies for which
innovation is critical, innovation effectiveness is added to the list of the board’s auditing missions.
Furthermore, the board can influence the company’s innovation by reviewing the performance of the
CEO and the top management team, by managing innovation risk, and by choosing a CEO with an
innovation focus. Moreover, Oh and Barker (2015) find that the number of interlocking directors has
a positive impact on R&D expenditures at the firm level. It is therefore reasonable to propose that
interlocking directors could impact patenting also.2
2A high profile motivating case is that of Eric Schmidt, the CEO of Google who served as a director on Apple’s board
until August 2009. Such interlocking arrangements between Silicon Valley companies are not uncommon. So long as
Schmidt was on the board of Apple, there was no litigation between these firms. However, following antitrust concerns
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that explores theoretically the formation of
director networks and its impact on patenting. Our empirical analysis confirms that interlocks have
a positive effect on patenting holds for UK firms. This is consistent with Helmers et al. (2017) who
exploit exogenous changes in India’s corporate governance framework and patent system to explore
the relationship between interlocking and patenting activity. However, our empirical results3 also
suggest that interlocked companies tend to converge in the technological classes under which their
patents are classified and are more likely to cite each other around the time of interlocking. Taking
into account that patenting tends to be the last stage in the innovation process, the fact that the
increase in citation tends to happen at the moment of interlocking leads us to advance an alternative
explanation to the knowledge spillover channel outlined by Helmers et al. (2017). Whereas these
authors interpret interlocks as a source of information on the strategic position of the firm operating
in foreign markets, our results point towards the use of interlocks as a mechanism by which firms
coordinate their patenting activity.
Our theoretical and empirical results have implications for policymakers in the field of corporate
governance and intellectual property. In terms of corporate governance, opinion tends to be polarised
around whether interlocked directors add value to the firm through greater levels of human capital
accumulation or whether directors interlock to subvert the monitoring of their performance and their
accountability to shareholders.4 The evidence presented in our paper suggests a subtle process at work
in which interlocked directors play an important role in facilitating the protection and coordination
of intellectual property rights arising from innovative activity. This is also important in light of prior
evidence suggesting that excessive and defensive patenting strategies by large firms impose considerable
administrative costs on patenting authorities. If an interlocking director can reduce frictions arising
from overlapping inventions (e.g., contested patent applications), then reducing restrictions on the
number of interlocking directors may help reduce the burden on patenting authorities.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present our theoretical model which motivates
our empirical work. Section 3 describes the data and presents a descriptive analysis before we outline
our empirical strategy in section 4 and present the empirical results in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical model
The intuition for our theoretical model can be understood within a framework where interlocking
directorships emerge as a solution to secure intellectual property rights. According to the literature
on patenting cited above, patenting is beset by uncertainty because firms may have competing claims
on a new technology. Firms that are closer technologically are more likely to enter into property
rights conflicts, the outcome of which is uncertain to the firm ex-ante. We identify conditions under
which this uncertainty generates a sub-optimal number of patents and where interlocking directorships
increase the number of patents.
and amid rumours that Schmidt’s relationship with Steve Jobs had broken down, Schmidt resigned from the board of
Apple. For the next four years, the two companies and various subsidiaries were involved in several patent infringement
cases (see FT.com, 2009-08-03).
3The corresponding empirical results are reported in Appendix B1 and B2. Note that, since we observe firms citing
each other and converging in the technological space already at the moment of interlocking, we argue it is more likely
that it was the technological proximity that motivated the interlock rather than interlocking increasing technological
proximity through knowledge exchange.
4Presently, regulators in Europe and the US have adopted a sceptical attitude towards interlocking. In the US, con-
cerns have been raised by anti-trust authorities and Sarbannes-Oxley explicitly contains provisions against interlocking.
In Europe, authorities generally adopt a more pragmatic approach via a ‘comply or explain’ regime. For example, an
interlocked director in a listed firm in the UK violates the criteria for independence and, to comply with the Code of Best
Practice, firms are prohibited from having more than half of their board as non-independent directors (Combined Code,
2012). Yet, firms are free to disregard this recommendation so long as they explain their non-compliance to shareholders.
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2.1 Model set up
Suppose there are two risk-neutral profit-maximising firms Fi, i ∈ {1, 2} each with a risk-neutral
utility-maximising director Di. We model the technological distance between two firms as the Eu-
clidean distance S: ε = ||ρ1 −ρ2||, where S is a continuous and finite n-dimensional space S ⊂ R
n and
ρi is the location of the existing technology for firm i (assumed to be common knowledge). Each firm
has an “Unambiguous Property Right” (UPR) over its existing technology. The UPR is defined as a
situation in which no other firm can claim property rights over that technology. In our framework,
patenting is required to achieve a UPR but it is not a sufficient condition if another firm patents the
same technology or another firm holds a patent which is sufficiently close in the technology space.
Each point in the technology space has a baseline rent r which can only be exploited if the firm has a
UPR over it.5 To allow the director to contribute to the value of the firm, we let the rent on a UPR
technology attributed to firm i to be expanded by the firm’s director according to:
ri = rτ(t) (1)
where τ(0) = 1, τ ′(.) > 0 and τ ′′(.) < 0 and t is the quantity of time devoted by the director to
expanding the profit opportunities associated with that technology. For simplicity, consider the UPR
to offer a continuum of symmetric opportunities for rent expansion on a unit interval. Note that since
we are assuming the existence of diminishing marginal returns associated with the director’s time
devoted to one technology, the available time t is then optimally devoted equally to each point in
this unit interval, expanding it according to τ( t1). Director Di has a maximum time allocation T = 1
which is supplied inelastically to the firm.6 In exchange, Di obtains a share w ∈ (0, 1) of the profit of
firm i.
The main focus of the paper is to explore how interlocking directorships impact upon the patenting
decisions of firms. Consequently, we start from an initial situation in which firms have already discov-
ered a new technology, ρ∗i ∈ S. We assume that each firm’s discovery of a patentable new technology
is common knowledge but that the location of that technology in the space is unknown for both firms.
The problem for each firm is then to decide whether, and by what means, to try to establish a UPR
over its new technology in order to extract the associated rent. We assume that there is an ex-ante
probability p(ε) ∈ [0, 1] that the two new technologies have an overlap, where p′(ε) ≤ 0 (i.e., the
probability of overlapping between the new technologies is declining in the Euclidean distance of the
firms’ original technologies). For simplicity, we assume that the probability of the new technologies
overlapping with either of the initial technologies is zero.
In order to analyse the optimal behaviour of each of the agents, we need to identify the payoffs in
each of the possible scenarios. If a firm is successful in attaining a UPR on its new technology then
it earns baseline rent r (in addition to that derived from the initial technology). We assume that the
productivity of the director’s time in expanding the profit opportunities of each of the technologies
is identical and alongside the assumed concavity of τ(.) the director’s time is optimally redistributed
equally across all technologies with a UPR and all the symmetric opportunities within each. Hence,








Note, in line with earlier reasoning, with two UPRs we now have rent expansion opportunities along
two separate intervals of length 1, where the time devoted per unit length is 12 . Figure 1 illustrates how
5Considering an alternative scenario, in which firms can also imperfectly exploit new technologies without establishing
a UPR, will reduce the incentives for firms to patent but will not alter the qualitative results that we develop below.
6A more general model that considers an elastic labor supply will not alter the main predictions of the model as what
matters here is how the director distributes working time across the different activities within the firm.
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the property of concavity of τ(.) results in the rewards to halving the time devoted to rent expansion






> τ(1). The existence of diminishing marginal returns associated with the director’s time
devoted to one technology implies that the profits of the firm increases with the number of business
opportunities (i.e. innovations) the firm handles. As illustrated in figure 1, the larger the degree of
concavity (the stronger the diminishing marginal returns are), the more profitable it is for the firm
to exploit both technologies with respect to operating just the original technology. The Figure also
explains what we mean by an increase in concavity of τ(.) in the context of the paper. Taking τ(1) as
a fixed (observed) value, a τ(.) with greater concavity will also pass through τ(1) (and have its origin
at τ = 1 by assumption) but everywhere in between will lie above the function with lower concavity -
as illustrated by the grey curve which is more concave than the black curve.
Figure 1: Concavity of τ(.)
We assume that firms incur a fixed cost, P , of applying for a patent. Once the firm invests this
fixed cost, the patent is assigned to the firm. If only one firm applies for a patent it gains a UPR on
its new technology. However, if both firms have obtained a patent for their technology the market
(Nature) reveals if there is an overlap - with the probability of an overlap being p(ε), as defined above.
If there is no overlap, both firms have a UPR on their new technologies and can extract the associated
rents according to Eq. (2). In the case of an overlap, the firms do not have a UPR on their new
technologies and so cannot extract rent from them and they enter into conflict, which only one firm
can win. At this stage, for simplicity, and since the firms are ex-ante symmetric, we assume that the
firms obtain the UPR on their patent with probability 12 .
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To avoid this situation, firms can decide to interlock in the first stage of the game before any
commitment to patenting is undertaken. If interlocking happens and there is an overlap, the interlocked
directors will be able to secure a proportion θ of the rents associated with the new technology for each
firm, provided that they devote some time to undertake these activities. A detailed discussion of the
costs and benefits of interlocking will be developed in section 2.2.8
7In reality firms tend to invest some resources to improve the probability of obtaining the patent. Notice that the
symmetry of firms guarantees that in the case in which firms have this investment option, both firms will invest the same
amount of resources and our results regarding when interlocking happens will be reinforced by including this possibility
more formally. We abstract from this problem to simplify the analysis.
8Alternatively we could assume that the interlocking decision is undertaken once it is revealed that a property right
conflict exists. Although in this case, the firms’ decision to interlock will not depend on the technological proximity of
both firms, the main results of the model regarding the impact of interlocking on patenting and the main determinants
5
The full game is characterised by Figure 2. Note that at the end of each final node, a vector of
letters appears. This vector denotes the subindex associated with the corresponding payoffs in each
final node.9 The possible outcomes in terms of the number of new patents is η ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and in terms
of the expected number of new patents is E(η) ∈ [0, 2]. We solve the model by backward induction.
In the next subsection we start by analysing the firms’ decisions to patent when the firms are not
engaging in interlocking. This analysis will also reveal what would happen in a situation where the
government does not permit, or restricts, interlocking.
Figure 2: Game Tree
2.1.1 The No-Interlocking Patent Subgame Γ(PNI)
We begin by observing that, under the conditions of the model outlined so far, the profit of a firm
with no interlocking when it patents and obtains a UPR over the new technology, and its profit when,










(1 − w), πf = rτ(1)(1 − w) (3)
The first element in each profit function reflects the rent generated by the firm under the corre-
sponding alternative scenarios. The second element reflects the fact that firms pay a proportion w of
their profits to their respective director.
of this relationship will not be altered in this new set-up.
9As it will become apparent in a further section, this game involves payoffs for both firms and directors in each
scenario. Describing the payoffs for each final node in the game tree may therefore be challenging. For that reason, we
adopted this notation. To help the reader to better understand the notation let us consider the following example. Note
that in the no interlocking subgame under overlap and W1, the vector of payoffs is characterized by (e,d). This means
that under this scenario, firms’ profits and directors’ utilities are, for firm 1, πe and Ue respectively and for firm 2, are
πd and Ud, respectively.
10Due to space constraints, in these sections we will describe the most relevant payoffs of the game. Table A.1 in
Appendix A reports the full set of payoffs for firms and directors for each possible scenario.
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To characterise the possible equilibria in this subgame we also require an expression for the expected
payoff to a firm under no interlocking where both firms opt to patent. We denote this expected profit,
E(πP NI), where:








+ (1 − p(ε))πe (4)
where πd = (rτ(1) − P )(1 − w) represents the profits of not obtaining the patent having incurred the
patenting cost. Note, the term [.] in Eq. (4) is the expected profit of obtaining the patent under the
existence of an overlap given that both firms patent and there is no interlocking.
In the patent subgame the firms face the payoff matrix in Table 1.
Table 1: Subgame Γ(PNI): No Interlocking, Patent (P ) versus No Patent (NP ) sub-
game
P2 NP2
P1 (E(πP NI), E(πP NI)) (πe, πf )
NP1 (πf , πe) (πf , πf )
Payoffs to: (F1, F2).
The subgame described above could exhibit different Nash equilibria depending on the parame-
ter configuration. However, there are two particular parameter sets which yield uninteresting Nash
equilibria in the context of this paper, which we now seek to eliminate.


















It is straightforward to show that under Assumption 1 we rule out the patent cost being so low
(high) that the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for this subgame is for both firms to patent (not patent)
when it is guaranteed that the technologies will overlap i.e. p(ε) = 1 (will not overlap, i.e. p(ε) = 0).11
A description of the relevant equilibria for the No-Interlocking subgame is provided in the following
lemma:
Lemma 1. 12 Under Assumption 1:
(i) if E(πP NI) ≥ πf , which requires p(ε) ≤
2(2rτ( 12 )−rτ(1)−P)
2rτ( 12 )−rτ(1)
, then there is a unique pure strategy
Nash equilibrium (weak in the case of the equality) in which both firms patent with the number of new
patents, η = 2, and expected firm profit is E(πP NI);
(ii) if E(πP NI) < πf , which requires p(ε) >
2(2rτ( 12 )−rτ(1)−P)
2rτ( 12 )−rτ(1)
, then there is a symmetric mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium in which firms patent with probability, γ ∈ (0, 1). The expected number of
new patents is strictly less than 2, E(η) = 2γ ∈ (0, 2), and the expected firm profit is πf .
Hence, from Lemma 1 the existence of uncertainty generates a situation in which both firms do
not necessarily patent.
11These cases are clearly uninteresting in the context of the paper since there is no scope for interlocking to increase
the number of patents. In the case of P ≤ P , then E(πP NI(p(ε) = 1)) ≥ πf , and the maximum number of patents is
always achieved without interlocking and with P ≥ P , then πe ≤ πf , and patenting is too expensive to be viable under
any scheme.
12See Appendix A for a formal proof.
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Lemma 2. The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the No-Interlocking subgame Γ(PNI) is more likely
to hold under a: (i) larger patenting cost, P , (ii) larger probability of overlapping new technologies,
p(ε), and, (iii) lower degree of concavity of τ(.).
Proof to Lemma 2. From Lemma 1 the condition for the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium arising as
the solution to the No-Interlocking subgame Γ(PNI) under Assumption 1(i) and yielding E(η) = 2γ ∈
(0, 2), can be written:





(2 − p(ε)) + P > 0 (6)
(i) The function e is clearly increasing in P . (ii) The function e is clearly increasing in p(ε). (iii)
Our definition of an increase in concavity (where τ(1) is held constant under the assumption this is
an observed reality, and τ(0) = 1 by assumption) is such that all points on the function in the open
interval t ∈ (0, 1), increase, as illustrated in Figure 1 in the movement from the less concave function
(black line) to the more concave function (grey line). Hence, in Eq. 6, whilst τ(1) is unchanged with





increases, reducing e, completing the proof.
Therefore, in a situation in which interlocking was not allowed, uncertainty will reduce firms’
incentives to patent resulting in a smaller number of patents and technologies exploited relative to
when interlocking was permitted. The following subsection analyses the interlocking subgame. This
analysis will reveal how interlocking directorships may offer an effective solution to increase the number
of patents and the number of technologies used in the economy, increasing economic rents.
2.2 Introducing Interlocking
As outlined in Figure 2, firms have the possibility of interlocking at the first stage of the game. If both
firms decide to interlock, this implies that one director of each firm will be sitting on the company
board of the other firm.13 Under an interlock agreement, each firm incurs an organisational overhead,
h.
The role played by interlocked directors in this game is that of mediating when a property right
conflict arises between them.14 Once the firms decide whether to interlock, the firms may decide non-
cooperatively to patent or not to patent the new technology.15 In the event in which both firms patent
and an overlap occurs, each director could facilitate mediation between both firms in such a way that
they can ensure UPR on a proportion θ ∈ (0, 1] of the rents associated with the new technologies for
each firm. To achieve this, each director must invest a time cost x in the mediation process leaving












13In practice interlocking takes the form of a director from one firm (the interlocking director) sitting on the board
of another firm rather than each firm committing a director to interlocking. We assume the latter for symmetrical
expedience without meaningfully affecting the nature of the results.
14Interlocking directors may have other channels through which they affect innovation. They may improve the efficiency
of the firm through the diffusion of better managerial practises. The increase in efficiency could increase potential market
size increasing the incentives to innovate. They may facilitate exchange of R&D personnel across firms, potentially
increasing diversity in the lab. They may also increase the transmission of knowledge across firms. However all of
these channels take time to materialize while our empirical results show that the effect is stronger at the moment of
interlocking. While the previous channels are worthy of exploration, our empirical evidence is more consistent with the
story advanced in this paper.
15For modelling convenience, we assume that under an interlock only symmetric outcomes are feasible - hence we rule
out the scenario in which one firm patents and the other does not. If the game were repeatedly played across different
pairs of new technologies it would be possible to imagine a scenario in which one firm might forgo property rights on its
new technology in one play of the game knowing the interlocking directors will ensure it is allocated the next one.
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In line with earlier reasoning, we now have a continuum of symmetric rent expansion opportunities
along an interval of length 1 + θ, with time per unit length available given by 1−x1+θ .
When firms interlock and there is a patent conflict the profit of each firm will be given by πa =
(1 − w)π̃ and the utility of each director will be Ua = wπ̃.
16 For interlocking to happen, we assume
that it must be incentive compatible for both directors and firms.17
In the next subsection we focus on the decision of patenting, conditional on being interlocked.
In addition, we will show, under certain conditions, that the availability of interlocking promotes
increased patenting.
2.2.1 The Patent Decision under Interlocking (Subgame Γ(PI))
We begin with the firms’ decisions to patent under interlocking. Once firms and directors have agreed
to interlock, the decision regarding whether or not to patent falls to the firms. The firms cooperatively
decide between patenting both new technologies and not patenting either new technology with expected
profits, respectively:
E(πP I) = p(ε)πa + (1 − p(ε))πb, πc = πf − h(1 − w)
where πb is the associated profit under interlocking and patenting when an overlap does not exist.
Lemma 3. The Nash equilibrium of the subgame Γ(PI) is for firms to patent if E(πP I) > πc. This is
more likely to hold under a: (i) smaller patenting cost, P , (ii) smaller director time-cost of interlock-
ing, x, (iii) smaller probability of overlapping new technologies, p(ε), (iv) higher proportion of new
technology UPR saved for each firm under an overlap by the actions of the interlocking directors, θ,
and, (v) higher degree of concavity of τ(.).









− P − h
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− P > 0 (8)





, τ ′(.) > 0 and (.) is decreasing
in x, f is strictly decreasing in x. (iii) Since {.} > 0, f is strictly decreasing in p(ε). (iv) f is strictly
































16This represents a simplification of the remuneration and incentive system of interlocking directors, excluding, amongst
other things, any human capital gains from interlocking (see for example Conyon and Read, 2006), but preserves the
essential properties i.e. there is an opportunity cost to the home firm and its director of interlocking since it decreases
the time available for directors to expand rents and earn their respective share of associated profit. Note, that taking
into account human capital effects for interlocking directors, for example through a concavity-preserving monotonic
transformation of τ(.), would, ceteris paribus, promote interlocking to both firms and directors.
17The idea that the decision to interlock has to be incentive compatible with all four players, including the directors,
reflects the observation that firms are not completely in control of what interlocks its directors choose to engage with as
suggested, for instance, by setting up remuneration schemes to disincentivise excessive interlocking (e.g. see Conyon and
Read, 2006).
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Recall, τ(0) = 1 and τ ′(.) > 0 so the vertical intercept of the function τ(.) is above zero and the
function is increasing. Further, since the function is increasing, the height of the function at 1−x1+θ is
greater than 1. Now note that [.] in Eq. (9) is the linear approximation of the vertical intercept based
on a Taylor series expansion at 1−x1+θ . Since the function is concave then this linear approximation
must lie everywhere above the function τ(.) and hence it’s vertical intercept must lie above 1, and
as such it must be positive. Hence, [.] in Eq. (9) is strictly positive. It is straightforward to see the
result holds so long a τ(.) is not too convex, however, τ(.) concave guarantees it. (v) The proof follows















− P > 0 (10)
Our definition of an increase in concavity (where τ(1) is held constant under the assumption this is
an observed reality, and τ(0) = 1 by assumption) is such that all points on the function in the open
interval t ∈ (0, 1), increase, as illustrated in Figure 1 in the movement from the less concave function
(black line) to the more concave function (grey line). Hence, in Eq. 10, whilst τ(1) is unchanged with










increase, completing the proof.
2.2.2 The Interlocking Decision
Up until now the relative payoffs of the directors have not featured in decision-making, but of course in
the decision whether to interlock or not, all parties have to be in favour for interlocking to result. Given
the assumption of risk neutrality and the specification of director remuneration as a fixed proportion
of firm profit, it is straightforward to see that the incentives of firms and directors are aligned. The
relative size of alternative payoffs that determine subgame Nash equilibria will be the same for all
agents. Hence, if patenting is the Nash equilibrium of the interlocking subgame for the directors then
it is also the Nash equilibrium for the firms. Expected utility for a director, in the Interlock Patent
subgame is given by:
E(UP I) = p(ε)Ua + (1 − p(ε))Ub (11)
Lemma 4. Expected utility for the directors under interlocking and patenting, E(UP I), is more likely to
be greater than under no interlocking and no patenting, Uf , under a: (i) smaller patenting cost, P , (ii)
smaller director time-cost of interlocking, x, (iii) smaller probability of overlapping new technologies,
p(ε), (iv) higher proportion of new technology UPR saved for each firm under overlap by the actions
of the interlocking directors, θ, (v) an increase in the concavity of τ(.), and (vi) smaller overhead for
interlocking, h.
Proof to Lemma 4. First, note that expected utility for the directors under interlocking and patenting,

















− h − P
]
(1 − p(ε)) − rτ(1)
}
> 0 (12)
(i)-(v) The comparative statics of the function g in Eq. (12) are analogous to that in Eq. (8) and
hence the proofs to Lemma 3 apply directly here. (vi) The function g in Eq. (12) is clearly decreasing
in h, completing the proof.
The main lesson from our model is that under certain scenarios patenting activity under interlock-
ing is higher than without interlocking, conditional on interlocking being the optimal strategy in the
game.
If E(πP I) > πc, E(UP I) > Uf and E(πP NI) < πf then the Nash equilibrium for game Γ(I) is
for firms and directors to interlock and patent, yielding an increase in the expected number of new
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patents of 2(1 − γ) > 0 compared to a situation in which interlocking was not an available option.
Proposition 1. The Nash equilibrium for game Γ(I) for firms and directors to interlock and patent,
yielding an increase in the expected number of new patents of 2(1 − γ) > 0 compared to a situation
in which interlocking was not an available option: (i) is unambiguously more likely under a smaller
director time-cost of interlocking, x, higher proportion of new technology UPR saved for each firm
under overlap by the actions of the interlocking directors, θ, and smaller overhead for interlocking, h,
(ii) requires the degree of concavity of τ(.), the patent cost, P and the probability of new technology
overlap, p(ε) to be neither too high nor too low.
Proof to Proposition 1. The proofs follow directly from the conditions supporting E(πP I) > πc, E(UP I) >
Uf and E(πP NI) < πf as outlined in Lemmas 2-4.
In situations satisfying the conditions in Proposition 1, firms interlock and the expected number of
patents increases after interlocking. Therefore, Proposition 1 directly implies a hypothesis to be tested:
Hypothesis: Interlocking causes an increase in patenting, ceteris paribus.
We test this hypothesis in the empirical section below.
2.3 Discussion
The theoretical model above has shown that ambiguities over the rights on intellectual property
can result in the emergence of a sub-optimal number of patents. However, the sub-optimal level of
patenting can be resolved if the option to interlock directors is available.
Under Lemmas 3 and 4 interlocking and patenting is more likely to be incentive compatible for
firms and directors when the size of the resolved overlapping property rights, θ, is higher, when the
director time-cost of interlocking, x, is smaller, when the fixed cost of interlocking, h, is smaller and
when τ(.) is more concave. We might expect these results to also be more likely as the firms are closer
in the technology space so that p(ε), the risk of overlap, is larger. However, although p(ε) needs to be
sufficiently high for the conditions of Lemma 1 (ii) to hold (under which non interlocking results in
strictly less than 2 new patents) it is not generally the case that higher p(ε) supports the incentives
for interlocking and patenting, as the direction of impact of an increase in p(ε) depends on other
parameters of the model.18
From an empirical perspective, one might suggest that the above conditions of Proposition 1 are
more likely to be present in more technology intensive industries. It could be argued that directors
in technology intensive industries might quickly earn experience in dealing with patenting activity
resulting in lower time costs (lower x) and greater impact (higher θ). In technology intensive industries,
we might also expect to see that the rent expansion (i.e. τ(.)) is quite concave, or in other words,
there are large decreasing returns associated with directors’ time within each innovation. Hence,
according to Lemmas 3 and 4 the conditions incentivising firm and director support for interlocking
and patenting might be more likely to hold in innovation intensive industries. We will explore this
possibility in the empirical part of the paper. On the other hand, condition (ii) in Lemma 1 does not
depend upon θ, x, or h, but it does require that τ(.) is not too concave.
To conclude, we have shown that where firms wish to patent and exploit viable new technologies,
but face a risk of property rights overlapping with rivals, then viable technologies may not be patented
and exploited. However, we have also seen that introducing the option of interlocking directors to
help disentangle property rights ambiguities can be incentive compatible and restore full patenting.
The central result of our theoretical model is that interlocking can lead to an increase in the patenting
18A formal proof of the above is available upon request.
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activities of interlocked companies. Further, we suggest that the conditions supporting the hypothesis
of Proposition 1 lend themselves potentially more favourably towards firms characterised by high
rather than low innovation intensity. Before moving to test the main hypothesis in the UK context,
we first describe the key features of our data and network measures, and then present some descriptive
analysis on the relationship between interlocking and patenting.
3 Data and network measures
Our main data source is the EPO PATSTAT database.19 This database provides bibliographic infor-
mation for all patents published by the major IP offices. An important feature of PATSTAT is that
it identifies ‘patent families’ so as to allow a more precise mapping from the number of applications
to the number of distinct inventions. The same invention filed in different countries would constitute
a single patent family of patent applications (the DOCDB definition). Singleton filings at only one
patent office are retained.
Data on UK firms’ directors are obtained from FAME 2013.20 We limit our analysis to manufac-
turing companies, as identified on the basis of their principal economic activity (NACE). By focusing
on manufacturing, we map more precisely the economic units that apply for patents into those that
implement a novel productive process or those that develop a patented product. On a practical per-
spective, our focus on manufacturing firms reduces the dataset to a manageable size and allows us
to run the analysis on a personal computer, even if the construction of network measures is com-
putationally expensive. Although this sample cannot be considered a perfect representation of the
entire population of the UK manufacturing firms, it is arguably less skewed towards larger units than
those used in most of the interlocking literature, which is generally focused only on listed companies
(e.g., Croci and Grassi, 2013). For each firm we observe the list of current and previous directors
and their appointments and resignations dates. With this information we are able to associate each
director to one or more companies over the period 1998-2012.21 We match PATSTAT and FAME over
the period 1998-2012 using strings of company names as a merging variable. Before executing the
merge, we standardise company names in both datasets to minimise the number of mismatches that
are caused by differences in punctuation or abbreviations. Our standardization algorithm is similar
to that implemented by Helmers et al. (2011) (henceforth HRS) to match previous versions of these
two datasets.22
3.1 Interlocking directorships across UK Companies
Interlocking directorships occur when non-executive directors sit on the boards of multiple companies.
In the terminology of Social Network Analysis the matched list of companies and directors can be
defined as an ‘edgelist’ of a ‘bipartite graphs’ in which firm-director couples represent edges between
two disjoint sets of nodes (i.e., directors and firms). Each bipartite graph is then transformed to its
‘one-mode projection’; that is, a network in which firms are nodes and interlocking directors are edges
between nodes (König and Battiston, 2009).
In the simplest form, a network of N companies in period t can be represented by the adjacency
matrix At; that is, an N × N square matrix with entries aij = 1 if there is at least one director sitting
19We use the October 2013 version of PATSTAT.
20FAME includes firms with a turnover or shareholder funds greater than 1.5 million pounds or with profits greater
than 150,000 pounds.
21Although FAME does not provide unique identification numbers for directors, we exploit the date of birth to address
cases of homonymity.
22Our match is very similar to that obtained by HRS (73,914 common cases against 2,106 cases that are unmatched
in our dataset but are in HRS). We also observe a large number of PATSTAT applicant IDs that are matched in our
dataset but not in HRS. These refer to patent applications filed after 2007 and thus are excluded from the HRS sample.
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at time t on the boards of firm i and j where i 6= j, and aij = 0 otherwise. The density of the network
is sparse, as the number of potential connections greatly outnumbers observed connections and the
majority of firms belong to communities of relatively few firms (see Appendix B3 for further details
of the network structure).
We can also construct a network where we only consider connections between firms belonging to
different business groups by eliminating from the original network all the within-group connections
(i.e., connections between firms that share the same global ultimate owner). This network is used
to construct DGAt; that is, the adjacency matrix where aij = 1 if there is an interlocking director
between firm i and j, and if i and j belong to different groups. Lastly, we obtain a third adjacency
matrix SIAt representing only edges between firms from the same 4-digit NACE industry. Adjacency
matrices are then used to compute vectors of ‘node degrees’, whose entries record the total number
of connections (NDt) of each firm in the sample, the number of its connections outside its business
group (DGNDt), and the number of its connections with firms that operate in the same 4-digit NACE
industry (SINDt):
NDt = At × I
DGNDt = DGAt × I
SINDt = SIAt × I
where I is a N × 1 column vector where each entry is equal to 1. Table 2 shows that, for our sample,
the proportion of interlocked firms increases over time, rising from 43% in 1998 to 53% in 2012. There
is also a decreasing trend in the proportion of interlocks outside the business group over the total
number of connections, from 59% in 1998 to 33% in 2012. The proportion of connections between
firms belonging to the same industry increases more slowly, passing from 30% in 1998 to 38% in
2012. The high proportion of interlocked firms and the prevalence of intra-group connections may be
explained by the composition of our sample that under-represents UK independent SMEs.
Table 2: Features of the interlocked network (1998-2012)
Year Ratio Ratio Ratio
ND > 0 DGND/ND SIND/ND
1998 0.429 0.596 0.304
2003 0.471 0.519 0.332
2008 0.507 0.384 0.378
2012 0.532 0.337 0.386
Notes: The first column reports the proportion of firms with at least one
connection. The second column reports the average ratio of ‘out of group’
connections over total connections across firms. The third column reports
the average proportion of connections with firms in the same industry over
total connections across firms.
3.2 Interlocking directorships and patenting
Our first measure of innovative output is the number of patent applications APPSit filed by com-
pany i at time t. Although we retain all applications irrespectively of the receiving authority, we
avoid double counting by considering all documents belonging to the same patent family as a unique
application.23 We also construct an indicator of firm patent stock (winsorized at the 99 percentile)
STOCKit following the common practice in the literature of applying a linear discount rate δ = 0.15
to the cumulated stock of past applications (Griliches and Mairesse, 1984):
23Patent families are identified by the EPO by associating to a unique family all applications that refer to the same
priority. A priority is the date of the first application to one of the patent offices.
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STOCKit = (1 − δ) × STOCKi,t−1 + APPSit (13)
Table 3 reports the number of firms, the proportion of applicants and the proportion of firms with
positive patent stock that we observe each year. The lower proportion of applicants in 2011 and 2012
is explained by the fact that PATSTAT 2013 reports only applications for which a patent has already
been published. We are likely to miss some of the 2011 and 2012 applications that had not yet been
published by October 2013 (i.e., when the snapshot of the patent dataset was taken) because it takes
18 months for an eligible application to translate into a publication.24
To investigate the relationship between interlocking and innovative activity, we compute the pro-
portion of patenting firms by interlocking status for each age bin. This allows us to acquire preliminary
evidence on the relationship between interlocks and patenting over a firm’s life cycle. Figure 3 shows
that, for almost all age levels, there is a greater proportion of patentees in the group of connected
firms. In addition, the gap between the patenting intensity of the two groups widens over a firm’s
age. Looking at the patent stock (right-hand side panel), we can see that, for firms with 1 year of age,
the difference in the proportion of firms with at least one patent between connected and unconnected
firms is about 5%. This gap evolves to about 15% for firms that have been in business for over 40
years. This evidence is both consistent with the positive effect of interlocking on innovative behavior
and with the greater likelihood for innovative firms to become interlocked.
Table 3: Patenting activity in the sample
Year Num. of Ratio Ratio
firms AP P Sit > 0 ST OCKit > 0
1998 13,935 0.076 0.311
1999 14,512 0.075 0.314
2000 15,114 0.076 0.320
2001 15,571 0.071 0.324
2002 15,999 0.069 0.326
2003 16,434 0.068 0.327
2004 16,579 0.061 0.327
2005 16,666 0.062 0.328
2006 16,710 0.061 0.330
2007 16,798 0.062 0.331
2008 16,723 0.057 0.332
2009 16,655 0.056 0.334
2010 16,733 0.053 0.334
2011 16,794 0.049 0.333
2012 16,567 0.045 0.335
Notes: The table reports the number of firms observed each year
(column 2), the proportion of firms that fill at least one patent ap-
plication (column 3), the proportion of firms with positive patent
stock (column 4).
A second piece of evidence supporting a relationship between interlocks and innovative activity
emerges when we graph the network of interlocked firms (see Figure B.1 in Appendix B3). We find that
patent applicants are often connected with other applicants. The endogeneous formation of interlocks
is a possible explanation for this pattern, whereby innovators tend to interlock with other innovators.
However, this pattern is also consistent with the presence of peer effects among connected firms, where
the innovative behaviour of one company affects the innovative output of the others.
24Firms can prolong publication by filing a Patent Coopeation Treaty (PCT) via the World Intellectual Propety
Organisation WIPO. This adds another 12 months until the patent is forwarded to the respective national office(s).
Firms may be incentivised to do so if they value the secrecy prior to the disclosure of their new technology. We thank
an anonymous referee for this comment.
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Finally, in order to investigate the existence of technological spillovers between interlocked firms,
we employ data on patent citations and the technological composition of firms’ patent portfolios, and
perform two empirical exercises; see Appendices B1 and B2 for a full discussion. The results obtained
reveal that interlocked companies are more likely to cite each other, especially around the time of
interlocking, and tend to exhibit a high degree of technological similarity of their patent portfolio in
the immediate period following their first interlock.






































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: The left-hand side panel plots the proportion of applicant firms (AP P Sit > 0) by age and interlocking status (NDit > 0). The
right-hand side panel plots the proportion of firms with positive patent stock (ST OCKit > 0).
4 Econometric framework
We now proceed to test the main hypothesis implied by our theoretical model. Our instrumental vari-
ables (IV) strategy aims at identifying: (i) the impact of interlocked directorships on firm patenting;
and, (ii) the strength of peer effects across interlocked companies. Ideally, we would like to observe
random connections across firms and to measure the impact of connectedness as the difference between
the expected innovative output of connected and unconnected companies, or as the different perfor-
mance of companies that are randomly associated with more or less innovative partners. However, the
network of interlocked firms is likely to evolve endogenously with respect to firms’ innovative strategies
and their accumulated knowledge. If companies’ decisions to share directors with other companies are
based on unobserved characteristics that are relevant for innovation, selection bias would prevent the
identification of the impact of interlocks on patenting. Similarly, if the observed patenting activity
of a firm provides a positive signal to potential partners, reverse causality may drive the positive
correlation between interlocking status and patenting. To address our research question, we consider
the following reduced form equation:
Yist = γ1Ci,t−1 + γ2
(
I(Pi,t−1 6= ∅) ∗ Ȳj∈Pi,t−1
)
+ X ′itµ + δs + δt + β1Ȳgt + β2Ȳst + β3Ȳct + ui + ǫit (14)
where Yist measures the innovative performance of firm i operating in sector s at time t, X
′
it is a vector
of firm-level observable characteristics, while δs and δt are 2-digit NACE industry and year effects,
respectively. The terms Ȳgt, Ȳst and Ȳct represent the innovative activity of companies that belong to
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the same business group, the same sector and the same county as firm i. These terms are introduced to
control for spillovers affecting firm i’s innovative activity that are not transmitted through interlocked
directorships, but are, instead, related to business group strategies or to technological and geographical
proximity with other innovative companies. The term Cit is the main variable of interest and represents
the firm’s connectedness through interlocking directorships. The set Pit includes all firms interlocked
with i at time t and I(Pit 6= ∅) is an indicator function assuming value one if the set Pit is non-empty,
and value zero otherwise. Ȳj∈Pit measures the innovative output of the firm i’s connections.
The parameters of interest are γ1 and γ2. The first measures the direct effect of connectedness on
Yist, whereas the second measures the peer effect generated by the innovative activities conducted by
the firms interlocked with i (i.e., ∀j ∈ Pit). Note that this effect is present only if firm i has at least
one connection. One can think of γ2 as a specific channel through which greater connectedness, as
measured by γ1, affects firm patenting. Lastly, ui captures unobserved firm-level fixed effects and ǫit
is an individual firm error term.
The main identification problem raised by Eq. 14 is potential omitted variable bias arising from the
correlation between Cit and ui. This problem occurs when firms interlock on the basis of unobservable
characteristics that are also correlated with patenting. A second problem is reverse causality: if
patenting companies are more attractive partners, we may expect new patent applications to increase
the opportunities of connections with companies. Indeed, our theoretical model suggests firms may
seek connections with those firms who regularly patent closely related technologies in order to avoid
property right conflicts. We address these problems by adopting a 2SLS estimator and two different
sets of instruments for the endogenous measures of connectedness.
We first investigate the treatment effect of acquiring new connections on a firm’s probability of
applying for a patent. To do so, we treat Eq. 14 as a linear probability model and estimate it by
2SLS, where the dependent variable is DAPPSit (a dummy variable assuming value one when the firm
applies for at least one patent), and the main variable of interest, Ci,t−1, is captured by addi,t−1; that
is, a dummy variable assuming value one if the firm added at least one new connection at time t−1, and
value zero otherwise. In the first stage regression on addi,t−1, we introduce two instruments excluded
from the second stage regression. These are the variables Retirei,t−1 and Hirei,t−1, representing the
ratio of retiring and newly hired directors, respectively, over the total number of directors at time
t − 1. While firms that hire new directors have more opportunities to acquire new connections, the
ratio of newly hired directors, unconditional on the past experience of the new hires, should not
impact directly on the innovative output of the company. This exclusion restriction is very likely to
hold when one considers that the variation in the ratios Retirei,t−1 and Hirei,t−1 is driven by non-
executive directors. These part-time, outside, directors may offer assistance in coordinating patent
right conflicts but are not employed to actively manage the level of innovation in the organisation. In
addition, this instrument is immune to reverse causality as it relates to connections that are acquired
by the company from hiring a director that is already sitting in the board of another company. It is
thus unrelated with connections arising from the external hiring of a serving director, which is more
likely to arise when the company signals its knowledge stock through patenting. As shown in Table 4,
while the two instruments are highly correlated with the endogenous variable addi,t−1, the correlation
coefficients with the dependent variable DAPPSit and the patenting outcomes of firms in the same
business group, sector and county (as captured by the Ȳ terms) have very small values.
Figure 3 suggests that connected and unconnected companies have a different probability of ap-
plying for patents at different age levels, and that this difference is reflected in a diverging evolution
of the patent stock over their life-cycle. A second specification further below is meant to capture
this long-run effect of connectedness on innovative output. In this version, we introduce the firm’s
patent stock STOCKit as the dependent variable, and the lagged number of connections ndi,t−1 as
the main variable of interest (i.e., Ci,t−1 in Eq. 14). Because ndi,t−1 is more persistent over time
than addi,t−1, we now employ two instruments that are more suitable to reflect this aspect of the
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Table 4: Pairwise correlation matrix
DAP Pit addi,t−1 Retirei,t−1 Hirei,t−1 Ȳst Ȳgt Ȳct
DAP Pit 1.0000
addi,t−1 0.0363 1.0000
Retirei,t−1 0.0411 0.2061 1.0000
Hirei,t−1 0.0207 0.2665 0.3089 1.0000
Ȳst 0.0899 0.0199 0.0445 0.0372 1.0000
Ȳgt 0.0632 0.0399 0.0496 0.0291 0.1311 1.0000
Ȳct 0.0698 0.0110 0.0307 0.0124 0.1098 0.0655 1.0000
ST OCKit ndi,t−1 JuniorDiri,t−1 SeniorDiri,t−1 Ȳst Ȳgt Ȳct
ST OCKit 1.0000
ndi,t−1 0.0721 1.0000
JuniorDiri,t−1 -0.0255 -0.0592 1.0000
SeniorDiri,t−1 -0.0244 -0.0822 -0.1486 1.0000
Ȳst 0.1299 0.0201 -0.0065 -0.0373 1.0000
Ȳgt 0.1304 0.0705 -0.0137 -0.0388 0.1311 1.0000
Ȳct 0.0632 0.0007 0.0103 -0.0318 0.1098 0.0655 1.0000
endogeneous regressor: JuniorDiri,t−1 and SeniorDiri,t−1. These two variables represent the ratio
of directors younger than 40 and the ratio of those older than 60, respectively, over the total number
of directors sitting on the board. The proportion of interlocking directors by age group follows a
bell-shaped distribution, with directors aged between 45 and 60 being most likely to serve on multiple
boards.25 This relationship is most likely determined by the evolution of a director’s reputation and
connections over their career, and by their occupational choice in later life. ‘Junior directors’ may
lack sufficient experience and reputation to be invited to sit on other companies’ boards, while ‘senior
directors’ may choose to reduce the time spent sitting in board meetings as they approach retirement.
The identifying assumption is that the proportion of junior and senior directors on the board
affects a firm’s patenting activity only indirectly through the likelihood of interlocks. Some studies
raise the point that a CEO’s incentive to promote innovation may change over their tenure within
a company and more generally over their career (e.g., Brickley et al., 1999; Manso, 2011). However
this is unlikely to present at threat to our exclusion restriction. In particular, the age of the CEO
(and their career concerns) do not drive variation in our instruments. Rather, the variation in our
instruments is driven by the ages of all the non-executive directors who have no management role in
the company. Hence, we argue that the age composition of the non-executive members of the board
is not a direct determinant of a firm’s patenting activity. As also shown in Table 4, the correlation
coefficients between the instruments JuniorDiri,t−1 and SeniorDiri,t−1 and the endogenous variable
ndi,t−1 are about three times larger, in absolute value, than the correlation coefficients between the
two instruments and the dependent variable STOCKit.
We proxy Ȳj∈Pi,t−1 as the average number of patent applications filed by companies that are directly
interlocked with firm i, Ȳgt as the average number of patent applications within the same business
group, Ȳst as the average number of patent applications of firms in the same 2-digit NACE industry,
and Ȳct as the average number of patent applications of firms based in the same county. Because the
innovative output of interlocked firms Ȳj∈Pi,t−1 is not observed for firms with ndit = 0, we exclude this
term from the model when we run regressions on the pooled sample of connected and unconnected
companies. This is equivalent to imposing the restriction γ2 = 0 and to identify the coefficient








for firms with a non-empty set of connected companies. In other words,
we first estimate the restricted specification of Eq. 14, where we do not attempt to disentangle the
unconditional effect of connectedness γ1 (i.e., the effect of connectedness that does not depend on the
25The relationship between these instruments and the number of firm interlocks is evident when we look at Figure B.3
in Appendix B3.
17
innovative output of the connected firms), and then estimate the unrestricted specification of Eq. 14
on the sub-sample of firms with at least one connection (i.e., ndit ≥ 1 ). The latter exercise allows
us to identify the average effect of connectedness on the innovative outcome of connected firms after
controlling for partners’ heterogeneous innovative performances.
The endogeneity of Ȳj∈Pi,t−1 may depend on selection bias if innovative companies are more likely
to interlock with each other. A second problem that is often discussed in the peer-effect literature is
that of ‘reflection’, which makes it impossible to identify the effect of peers’ behaviour on individual
behaviour when both depend on the same set of group-level attributes (Manski, 1993). Moreover,
peers’ outcomes depend on individuals’ outcomes generating reverse causality. We address these
problems by taking advantage of the network structure of interlocking directors and instrumenting
the average number of patent applications among firm i’s connections with the average patent stock
of the firm’s second degree connections; that is, the connections of firm i’s connections that are not
directly interlocked with firm i. The identification assumption underpinning this strategy is that the
characteristics of second-degree connections of firm i affect the firm’s outcome only through their
impact on the outcome of its first-degree connections.26
5 Results
We first comment on the results obtained by estimating Eq. 14 on the sample that includes both
interlocked and non-interlocked companies. The first four columns of Table 5 report the estimates of
regressions of the dummy addi,t−1 (taking value one if the firm added at least one new connection at
time t−1) on the dummy DAPPit (taking value one when the firm applies for at least one patent). The
remaining four columns report estimates from regressing the lagged number of interlocked connections
ndi,t−1 on the patent stock of the company STOCKit. We report first and second stage estimates for
both a ‘short’ specification (i.e., including only the variable of interest, the log of a firm’s age log(age)it,
industry and year fixed effects) and a ‘long’ specification with additional controls.27 Specifically, in
the ‘long’ specification, we also control for a firm’s lagged capital intensity computed as the log of
fixed assets over the number of employees CapInti,t−1, its independence status Indepit, its lagged size
proxied by the log of the number of employees log(empl)i,t−1, the number of directors in its board
BoardSizeit, and the average number of patent applications at the 2-digit NACE industry level Ȳst,
the business group level Ȳgt, and the UK county level Ȳct.
The estimated coefficient of addi,t−1 in the second stage regression on DAPPit suggests that,
adding at least one new connection in the previous period increases the probability of applying for a
new patent by 14 percentage points (on average). This supports the hypothesis implied by proposition
1 of the theoretical model. This effect is reduced to 6 percentage points once we control for other
firm characteristics and spillover effects. Because the overall proportion of applicants each year is on
average 9%, the impact of increased connectedness appears economically significant, hence supporting
the argument that connectedness increases the expected returns or reduces the costs of patenting
innovations. Over time, the higher patenting propensity of interlocked companies is reflected in the
relationship between the number of a firm’s connections and the size of their patent stocks. The
estimated coefficient of ndi,t−1 suggests that each connection increases a firm’s number of patents by
0.6 (on average), and this result does not change once we estimate the ‘long’ specification of the model
28.
26This is similar in spirit to the estimating strategy proposed by Bramoullé et al. (2009). Ideally, we would obtain
an estimating equation driven by exogenous variation in characteristics of the firm’s peers. However, in the absence of
other instruments, our best strategy is to instrument first degree connections with second degree connections.
27We do not have information on R&D expenditure, a potentially relevant variable for patenting activity. However, to
the extent that R&D expenditure is correlated with firm size, our estimates are unlikely to be severely biased from this
omission.
28OLS estimates (available on request) return coefficients of the same sign but smaller in magnitude in comparison to
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Table 5: Connectedness and patents
Dependent : DAP Pit ST OCKit
Specification : (a) (b) (a) (b)
Estim.Stage : 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage





log(age)it 0.014*** 0.003*** 0.009*** -0.011*** 0.325*** 0.161*** 0.288*** -0.061**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.046) (0.016) (0.081) (0.026)
CapInti,t−1 0.007*** -0.002*** 0.290*** -0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.051) (0.015)
Indepit -0.017*** -0.024*** 0.105 -0.599***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.157) (0.070)
log(empl)i,t−1 0.029*** 0.013*** 0.759*** 0.313***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.119) (0.021)
BoardSizeit 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.067 0.158***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.056) (0.011)
Ȳst 0.022*** -0.001 0.817*** 0.110
(0.006) (0.004) (0.265) (0.069)
Ȳgt 0.005** 0.004*** 0.245** 0.053***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.102) (0.021)
Ȳct 0.042*** 0.008 1.097*** 0.052










Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.389 0.341 0.831 0.391
AP F-test 3887.36 1287.89 367.93 75.34
Obs. 200,279 200,279 63,199 63,199 220,407 220,407 63,752 63,752
Notes: The table reports both first stage and second stage 2SLS estimation results of models on DAP Pit and ST OCKit. For each model we
estimate a ‘short’ specification including only the log of the firm’s age log(age)it as a control variable, and a ‘long’ specification including the
following set of firm-level controls: CapInti,t−1 is the log of the firm’s capital per employee at time t − 1, Indepit is a dummy for independent
firms, log(empl)i,t−1 is the log of the firm’s size proxied by the number of employees at time t − 1, BoardSizeit is the number of directors on
a company’s board. Ȳst, Ȳgt, Ȳct capture the average of the dependent variable across firms belonging to the same 2-digit NACE industry, the
same business group and the same county, respectively. The set of excluded instruments include Hireit and Retireit in models on DAP Pit,
and JuniorDirit and SeniorDirit in models on ST OCKit. JuniorDirit and SeniorDirit are respectively the ratio of directors under 40
years of age or above 60 on a company’s board. Hireit and Retireit are respectively the ratio of retiring directors or newly hired directors on
a company’s board. Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (cluster unit: firm). Significance levels: *.1, **.05,***.01.
The Angrist-Pischke (AP) F statistics from first stage regressions on addi,t−1 and ndi,t−1 provide
evidence that the regressions do not suffer from the weak instrument problem and the Hansen J
statistics show that our instruments are uncorrelated with the second stage errors.29 First stage
coefficients on Retirei,t−1 and Hirei,t−1 confirm that the turnover in the board of directors affects
positively the interlocking probability. As we expect, the proportion of younger and older directors
in the board is negatively correlated with the number of interlocks. Therefore, there is sufficient
statistical support to claim that we correctly identify the positive impact of connectedness on the
number of successful patent applications filed by a company.
To measure the sensitivity of the relationship between a company’s own patent stock and the
patent intensity of its peers, we repeat the estimation of the model on the sample of firms with
at least one connection. The inclusion of the term Ȳj∈Pi,t−1 (measuring the application intensity of
firms’ connections or the average number of patents in their portfolio) is introduced to capture peer
effects. Results are reported in Table 6. Once we include this term, we find that the coefficient on
addi,t−1 in the regressions on DAPPit is reduced to 0.05 and 0.03 respectively in the ‘short’ and
‘long’ specifications of the model. In addition, the coefficient of ndi,t−1 on STOCKit is rendered
the IV results. This suggests the direction of selection bias is downwards.
29To provide further support for this, we estimate the first stage equations by random effects and then augment the
specifications with the dependent variable of the second stage equations. As shown in Table B.4 (Appendix B3), the
dependent variable (both in the current period and the previous period) enters the specifications statistically insignifi-
cantly and leaves the estimates on the instruments virtually unchanged. This suggests that the error terms of the first
stage regressions are uncorrelated with the innovative output.
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Table 6: Connectedness and peer effects
(DAP Pit|ndit > 0) (ST OCKit|ndit > 0)






0.034*** 0.037*** 0.662*** 0.718***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.116) (0.181)
log(age)it 0.020*** 0.013*** 0.494*** 0.383***















nace FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.292 0.381 0.811 0.270
AP F-test (addi,t−1 or ndi,t−1) 3560.41 1414.19 187.30 76.97
AP F-test (Ȳj∈Pi,t−1 ) 378.06 156.01 936.02 333.00
Obs. 101,114 37,900 110,735 38,303
Notes: The table reports second stage 2SLS estimates of models on DAP Pit and
ST OCKit for firms with at least one interlock ndt > 0. The set of excluded instruments
include Hireit, Retireit and Ȳj∈Pi,t−2 in models on DAP Pit, and JuniorDirit,
SeniorDirit and Ȳj∈Pi,t−2 in models on ST OCKit. The instrument Ȳj∈Pi,t−2 is
the average number of patent applications (in models on DAP Pit) or the average num-
ber of patents in a firm’s portfolio (in models on ST OCKit), computed across the
second degree connections of the company. Significance levels: *.1, **.05,***.01. See
also notes for Table 5.
insignificant. These results suggest that, the impact of connectedness on a firm’s patenting behaviour
is conditional on the patenting activity of its connections. In other words, interlocks increase patent
applications only for those firms that connect with peers that are active in patenting. Qualitatively,
the estimates suggest that if peers’ application intensity (i.e., the average number of applications
among a company’s connections) increases by one application, the probability that a company applies
for a patent increases by 3 percentage points. In the long run, this effect has an important impact
on connected firms’ patent stocks, as we find that, if peers’ patent intensity (i.e., the average number
of patents held by the peers of a company) increases by one patent, the patent stock of the company
increases, on average, by 0.6. This result explains the divergence in the patent stocks of connected
and unconnected companies as they age over time, as observed in Figure 3.
Our theoretical model also suggests that the interlocking-patenting relation is stronger in firms
where technology is more important in their business. To examine this idea, we restrict the sample
to include only the most technology-intensive industries30 and estimate the same regression set-up.
The results, displayed in Table B.5 (Appendix B3), indicate that when we focus on these industries
(which constitute one-third of our sample), the impact of interlocking on patenting activities is much
more pronounced, especially in the regressions on STOCKit. Specifically, the estimated coefficient on
ndi,t−1 suggests that each connection increases a firm’s number of patents by almost 2; that is, three
times more than for the full sample of industries.
An important caveat with respect to interpreting our results is that innovation and patenting are
not equivalent. In our model, an increase in patenting is associated with an increase in innovation, in
30Following BIS (2011), we include the following industries: (i) chemicals and chemical products; (ii) basic pharmaceu-
tical products and pharmaceutical preparations; (iii) computer, electronic and optical products; (iv) electrical equipment;
(v) other manufacturing (musical instruments, medical and dental instruments and supplies, sports goods, games and
toys, etc).
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the sense that firms need to obtain intellectual property rights for each new technology they desire to
operate. Due to data limitations, in the current work we neither observe whether a new technology
has been used in secrecy nor protected under an alternative Intellectual Property Tool, nor whether
interlocking has increased firms’ innovation efforts. Therefore, we are unable to conclude that inter-
locked firms are more innovative per se, but only that they patent more often. It remains possible
that non-interlocking firms also innovate but use alternative strategies other than patenting protect
their inventions.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides new insights into the role of interlocking directors for patenting activity. In
particular, it contributes to the literature in two main aspects. First, we develop a formal framework
that identifies interlocking directorships as a mechanism for resolving property rights conflicts that
arise between innovating firms. In particular, we argue that interlocking directors can prevent such
conflicts by allocating appropriate time resource to the interlocked companies. Second, we use data
from about 70,000 firms in the UK over the period 1998-2012 to investigate the impact of connectedness
and peer effects on patent applications.
In our theoretical model, when firms choose to patent they face uncertainty regarding whether
they are actually going to enjoy the monopoly profits associated with the patent. This is because
there is a possibility that their technology overlaps with that of a competing firm which could lead to
an intellectual property (IP) rights conflict. The uncertainty regarding whether the firm is going to
win in the case of conflict, with entitlement to use the patent, may deter investment in patenting. In
this context, interlocking directors emerge as a solution that coordinates actions across firms in such
a way that both firms are able to enjoy a part of the patenting rents.
Consistent with the main hypothesis implied by our theoretical model, we find that adding at least
one new connection increases the probability of applying for a patent in the next year by up to 14
percentage points. In addition, the impact of connectedness on a firm’s patenting behaviour appears
to be conditional on the patenting activity of the firm’s connections: a rise in peer patenting intensity
by one application increases the probability of applying for a patent in the next year by 3 percentage
points. These results are stronger in technology intensive industries.
From a policy point of view, our results emphasise the role of interlocking directorates as one of the
driving forces behind higher patenting activity and innovation performance. We argue this is driven
by patent coordination. Absent interlocking, the uncertainty associated with patenting litigation may
deter investment in patenting. Interlocking directors allow firms to coordinate and share the patenting
rents. Of course, we do not claim that patent coordination is the only reason why firms interlock and
there may be other considerations. Of primary concern is the potential for corporate ties to facilitate
anti-competitive behaviour or diminish the quality of corporate governance. A board of directors
compromised by conflicts of interests or that consolidates the entrenchment of incumbent managers
or turns a blind eye to executive pay inflation is unlikely to be welfare enhancing. Nevertheless,
adopting a more positive stance than present with respect to interlocking could have a positive impact
on innovation and reduce welfare reducing patent wars. Indeed, the patenting ‘thicket’ literature
has found that some firms respond to property rights conflicts by flooding patenting authorities with
marginal applications (von Graevenitz et al., 2013).
To the extent that interlocking directors can act as key players in facilitating the protection of
intellectual property rights and mitigate frictions arising from overlapping inventions, reducing re-
strictions on the number of interlocking directors may help alleviate large administrative costs for
patenting authorities. Another implication arising from patents thickets is that our main empirical
result, interlocking directors increase patenting, could be viewed as a conservative lower bound es-
timate. As our theoretical model argues that interlocking directors facilitate coordination, marginal
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thicket-like patents might diminish under interlocking. However, our current model abstracts from
thickets and hence we leave testing this proposition for future research.31 Alternatively, interlocking
directors could be used by firms as a ploy to increase strategic patents that block competitors not
party to the interlocking arrangement. As such without further research, the net effect of interlocking
on strategic patenting is unclear.




Table A.1: Payoffs to firms, πm, and directors, Um, at outcomes m ∈ {a, b, c, d, e, f}
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Proof to Lemma 1. (i) In the case of E(πP NI) ≥ πf , since, by Assumption 1, πe > E(πP NI), it
follows that this game has a (weak in the case of the equality) unique symmetric pure strategy Nash
equilibrium with both firms patenting, η = 2, and earning expected profit E(πP NI). (ii) In the case


















Under Assumption 1, E(πP NI) < πf yields a game with a mixed strategy Nash equilibria. The
expected profit for firm i playing patent with probability γi is given by E(πi(γi)) = γiγjE(πP NI) +
γi(1−γj)πe+(1−γi)πf . Differentiating with respect to γi, setting equal to zero and solving, recognising
symmetry, γ = γi = γj , yields:
γ =
πe − πf


















Notice that under Assumption 1 and applying the inequality Eq. (A.i) in Eq. (A.ii), γ must lie in the
open interval: γ ∈ (0, 1).
Next, the expected number of patents in this subgame is then:
E(η) = 2γ2 + 2γ(1 − γ) + 0(1 − γ)2 = 2γ
whereupon, given γ ∈ (0, 1), then E(η) ∈ (0, 2). Hence, the expected number of patents is strictly less
than 2.
Finally, expected firm profit is given by:
E(π(γ)) = γ2 (E(πP NI − πe)) + γ(πe − πf ) + πf = πf
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B. Empirical Appendix
In Appendices B1 and B2, we consider the relationship between interlocks and patent citations and
subsequently the path of technological convergence of firms’ patent portfolios. Our main motivation
behind this exercise is to offer more evidence to support our theoretical model about patent coordina-
tion, from an alternative explanation based on technological spillovers as a source for interlocking and
subsequent increase in patenting activities. Since we do not have a very clean source of identification
for these exercises, we have placed this material in the appendix. Nevertheless, we feel that these
exercises are informative and are, at least, descriptively consistent with our theoretical framework
where interlocking is used as a device to coordinate patenting behaviour.
Appendix B1: Interlocks and patent citations
Ideally, we would like to compare the probability that a citation occurs between interlocked firms with
the probability that it occurs between one of them and each one of all its ‘placebo’ interlocks, defined
as firms that are not interlocked with the target company, but are sufficiently similar to its actual
interlocks. Two issues prevent us from implementing this approach. First, the fact that we observe
only a few partners for each interlocked firm does not allow the estimation of a propensity score that
indicates which other companies are ‘potential’ partners. Second, the dataset including only ‘actual’
and ‘placebo’ interlocks may not be a random draw from the population of firms that may cite each
other. Instead, estimation on the population of all possible firm couples is not feasible because of the
unmanageably large number of observations that must be generated. Our second best strategy is to
restrict our estimation sample to the set of firm couples that cite each other at some point in time
between 1998 and 2012. On this sample, we adopt a difference-in-differences model that identifies
the causal impact of interlocks by exploiting the difference in probability of citation across couples of
interlocked and non-interlocked companies between periods preceding and following the creation of an
interlock. To do so, we estimate the following probit model allowing for couple specific random effects
uij :










cij,t+s + δt) (B.i)
where the dependent variable is the probability that firm i cites a patent of firm j at time t, conditional
on observing at least one citation from i to j over the whole period. Φ(·) is the cumulative probability
function from the standard normal distribution. Its argument is a linear combination of the attributes
of the citing and the cited firm X ′it and X
′
jt and couple-specific characteristics X
′
ij , and includes a set
of dummies that, for couples of interlocked companies, assume value one in the period of their first
connection and in each one of the four periods preceding or following their interlock. These dummies
assume value 0 in all periods for couples of firms that do not interlock over the same period.
If interlocking directorships facilitate exchange of knowledge across companies, we should expect
that the difference in the probability of citation between couples of firms that interlock and those that
do not interlock to be statistically insignificant in periods preceding the interlock and to be positive
and significant in periods following the interlock. On one hand, the condition Cij = 1 ensures that
we are considering only couples of firms that have the right characteristics to build on each other’s
knowledge. On the other hand, we cannot claim that we estimate the unconditional effect of interlocks
on the citation probability, as we only exploit the timing of citation for identification.
Table B.1 reports the corresponding estimates. Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are
relatively large due to the small number of interlocks in the sample (see Table B.2). The low precision
of the point estimates suggests a qualitative interpretation of the results. The three columns of Table
B.1 report the coefficients obtained by estimating the model on the whole sample, on the sample
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Table B.1: Probability of citation
Whole Same Different
sample business group business groups
lockij,t−4 0.305* 0.400 -0.077
(0.183) (0.247) (0.349)
lockij,t−3 0.057 -0.104 0.048
(0.191) (0.269) (0.305)
lockij,t−2 0.168 0.144 -0.070
(0.159) (0.210) (0.292)
lockij,t−1 0.138 0.073 -0.055
(0.159) (0.223) (0.260)
lockijt 0.341** 0.002 0.508**
(0.143) (0.217) (0.205)
lockij,t+1 0.289* -0.041 0.447**
(0.153) (0.230) (0.220)
lockij,t+2 0.205 0.049 0.170
(0.161) (0.241) (0.233)
lockij,t+3 -0.014 -0.208 -0.002
(0.180) (0.258) (0.264)
lockij,t+4 0.050 -0.049 -0.041
(0.194) (0.290) (0.280)
P atCountit 0.195*** 0.307*** 0.189***
(0.007) (0.030) (0.007)
P atStockjt 0.036*** 0.077*** 0.036***
(0.003) (0.020) (0.003)
SameIndustryij 0.215*** 0.234*** 0.187***
(0.022) (0.081) (0.023)
Log(age)it -0.054*** -0.079** -0.052***
(0.008) (0.039) (0.008)
Log(age)jt -0.007 -0.020 -0.004
(0.009) (0.041) (0.009)
Couples 4,864 188 4,676
Obs. 64,647 2,442 62,205
Notes: The Table reports the results of random effects probit estima-
tion where the panel unit is set at the level of each firm couple. The
estimation sample includes only firms that cite each others’ patents at
some point in time during the period 1998-2012. We report a set of dum-
mies assuming value one in the year the couple interlocks (lockijt) or in
each of the four years before and after the interlock. These dummies
assume value 0 for firm couples that do not interlock over this period of
time. Estimation is conducted separately on the whole sample (column
1), on the sample including only couples of firms belonging to the same
business group (column 2) and on that including only couples of firms
from different business groups (column 3). Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Significance levels: *.1, **.05,***.01.
Table B.2: Interlocks and citations
Not interlocked Interlocked
Not citing 57,383 1,988
Citing 7,337 405
Column Total 64,720 2,393
Notes: The Table reports the number of firm couples / year
observations retained in the estimation sample. The model is
estimated on an unbalanced panel including on average 4,500
firm couples per year over the period 1998-2012.
including only couples of firms belonging to the same business group, and on the sample including
only couples of firms belonging to different business groups. Comparing the results obtained across
these samples, we may infer whether the relationship between interlocks and patenting is the same
when connections are created in the presence of ownership ties between companies.32 In the model we
also control for the number of patents in the patent stock of the cited company PatStockjt, the number
of applications of the citing company PatCountit, the age of the two firms, and their belonging to the
same 2-digit NACE industry. We include a dummy equal to one in the period of the first interlock
between the two firms lockijt, a set of dummies lockij,t−s assuming value one in one of the s periods
32To compare the coefficients obtained on the three samples within the same specification, we also estimate a model
including interaction terms between the variables of interest and a dummy assuming value one if both the citing and
the cited firm belong to the same business group. Results are in line with those reported in Table B.1 and are available
upon request.
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preceding the interlock, and a set of dummies lockij,t+s assuming value one in one of the s periods
following the interlock.33
By estimating the model on the whole sample, we find a statistically significant increase in the
probability of citation in the period when the first interlock is created and in the following period.
However, the coefficient on lockij,t+1 is only significant at the 10% level. Point estimates for the
periods preceding the interlock are not significant at the 5% level. When we estimate the model on
the split samples of firm couples that belong to the same or different business groups, we find that the
previous results are confirmed only for citations occurring between firms belonging to different groups.
We interpret this evidence as supporting the argument that interlocks serve as information channels
or coordination mechanisms across firms only in the absence of other organizational linkages between
them.
Appendix B2: Interlocks and technological convergence
We now turn to investigate the path of technological convergence of firms’ patent portfolios as an
alternative strategy to capture technological spillovers between interlocked firms. To construct a time
varying index of technological similarity of the patent portfolio of interlocked firms, we exploit the
IPC technological classification of patents reported in PATSTAT. The index is constructed as the one
introduced by Schott (2004) to measure the similarity in the composition of exports across countries.






where c is an index for IPC technological classes and I is the set of all classes observed in PATSTAT
(defined as the first 4 characters and numbers of the IPC string as it appears on the patent applica-
tion), scit and scjt are the shares of patents classified in subclass c in the portfolios of firms i and j
evaluated at time t. This index ranges from 0 for complete technological dissimilarity, to 1 for com-
plete technological similarity. If firms i and j apply for patents in more similar technological classes
after getting connected, we should expect a positive effect of interlocked directorship on PSIijt. For
each couple of interlocked companies we compute this index for the whole period 1997-2012.34 We











cij,t+s + δt + ǫijt (B.iii)
where, on the right-hand side, we adopt the same specification used in the model on citations. Because
we include only couples of interlocked companies in the estimation sample, this specification cannot be
considered as a difference-in-differences model. On the contrary, identification relies on the comparison
of the PSI of ‘treated’ firms before and after receiving the treatment (that is, getting interlocked).
Nevertheless, we can control for time-specific confounding factors by including year effects δt as firms
get interlocked at different points in time. This model is estimated using a random-effect tobit model
to deal with the large number of 0 values in the distribution of the PSI.
Table B.3 reports the corresponding results. On the whole sample, we find evidence of technological
convergence starting one period before the first interlock. Coefficients on the dummies for the period of
the interlock lockijt and for later periods are positive and significant at the 1% level, and suggest that
the PSI increases monotonically starting from the year before the interlock. Similarly to what we found
33We report the specification including four dummies for periods preceding and following the interlock. Running the
regressions including longer or shorter timing structures around the interlock produces very similar results.
34We limit this analysis to interlocked companies because the computation of this index is very time-expensive.
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for citations, there is no evidence of technological convergence for couples of interlocked companies
that belong to the same business group. On the contrary, between couples of firms belonging to
different groups, it appears that technological convergence starts later on; that is, two years after the
occurrence of the first interlock.
Table B.3: Technological convergence
Whole Same Different
sample business group business groups
(1) (2) (3)
lockij,t−4 -0.013*** -0.007 -0.016***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
lockij,t−3 -0.005 0.005 -0.012***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
lockij,t−2 0.001 0.004 -0.005
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
lockij,t−1 0.009*** 0.009* 0.003
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
lockijt 0.011*** 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
lockij,t+1 0.016*** 0.006 0.006
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
lockij,t+2 0.015*** 0.000 0.013***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
lockij,t+3 0.018*** 0.002 0.022***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
lockij,t+4 0.021*** 0.008 0.020***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
SameIndustryij 0.098*** 0.006 0.137***
(0.004) (0.011) (0.007)
Couples 10,182 3,326 7,984
Obs. 152,730 42,004 110,726
Notes: The Table reports random effects tobit estimates on the PSI. The
estimation is repeated on the whole sample of firm-couples that interlock
over the period 1998-2012 (column 1), the sample of firm couples belong-
ing to the same business group (column 2), and the sample of interlocking
firm couples from different business groups (column 3). Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: *.1, **.05,***.01.
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Appendix B3: Tables and Figures
Figure B.1 shows the network of firms connected by interlocking directors in 1998. Each circle in the
figure represents one company. Interlocked companies are clustered together or they are connected
by black lines. The round shape of the graph is produced by the Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm
that optimises the position of the nodes in the space.35 Different colours are associated to firms
with different number of patent applications in 1998. Figure B.2 is a histogram of community size
within the network, showing a small number of relatively large communities. Figure B.3 illustrates
the relationship between the number of firm interlocks and directors’ age.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































● ● ●no application one application more than one application
35This graph has been created using the package igraph available on R.
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Figure B.2: Patent applications across interlocked firms in 1998
2 4 6 8 11 14 17 20 23 26 29 32 35 38 41 46 49 53 56 59 64 72 83 94 109 153 224 551
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Directors' age groups
Notes: Each bar represents the proportion of directors of each age that serve in more than one
company.
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Table B.4: Connectedness and instruments
Dependent : addit ndit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Retireit 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.161***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Hireit 0.384*** 0.384*** 0.384***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
JuniorDirit -0.153*** -0.153*** -0.154***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
SeniorDirit -0.139*** -0.139*** -0.135***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
log(age)it -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.088*** -0.089*** -0.055**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
CapIntit -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.012 -0.012 -0.014
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Indepit -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.796*** -0.794*** -0.799***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
log(empl)it 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.107*** 0.105*** 0.102***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
BoardSizeit 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.222*** 0.222*** 0.220***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Ȳst -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.047 -0.048 -0.051
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032)
Ȳgt 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Ȳct -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.096* -0.097* -0.112**









Notes: The Table reports random effects estimates of the first stage equations on addit and
ndit, before and after adding the dependent variable of the second stage equations (DAP Pit
and ST OCKit, respectively) as control. All regressions include industry and year effects.
Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (cluster unit: firm). Significance
levels: *.1, **.05,***.01.
Table B.5: Connectedness and patents: technology-intensive industries
Dependent : DAP Pit ST OCKit
Specification : (a) (b) (a) (b)
Estim.Stage : 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage





log(age)it 0.017*** 0.001 0.010** -0.011*** 1.208*** 0.134*** 1.089*** -0.033
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.199) (0.030) (0.323) (0.048)
CapInti,t−1 0.012*** -0.002 0.667*** 0.010
(0.003) (0.002) (0.191) (0.030)
Indepit -0.027** -0.019** 0.105 -0.724***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.678) (0.109)
log(empl)i,t−1 0.037*** 0.011*** 2.306*** 0.208***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.394) (0.037)
BoardSizeit 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.182 0.186***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.217) (0.019)
Ȳst 0.032*** 0.003 2.198** 0.251**
(0.012) (0.007) (0.950) (0.105)
Ȳgt 0.004 0.003** 0.312 0.052*
(0.003) (0.001) (0.200) (0.030)
Ȳct 0.056*** -0.012 3.462*** -0.171










Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.381 0.541 0.944 0.479
AP F-test 2739.05 892.41 260.87 78.59
Obs. 65,681 65,681 21,189 21,189 72,151 72,151 21,360 21,360
See notes for Table 5. Technology-intensive manufacturing industries include: (i) chemicals and chemical products; (ii) basic pharmaceutical
products and pharmaceutical preparations; (iii) computer, electronic and optical products; (iv) electrical equipment; (v) other manufacturing.
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